State channels with state assertions

Chris Buckland and Patrick McCorry

SOSTIENE PEREIRA QUE ÉL ERA UN BUEN CATÓLICO.



A **known set** of cooperating participants achieve local consensus, whilst relying on the blockchain to achieve **safety** and **liveness**

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- 3. If parties cannot cooperate off-chain, one party can force the continuation on chain
- 4. When parties move state back on-chain they are both given an opportunity to present their latest state "Dispute resolution"

So what's the problem?

A cooperation break down results in the usual costly **transaction fees**, and high latency

















Accept any state as input, then wait for a fraud proof







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SOSTIEME PEREIRA QUE ÉL ERA UN BUEN CATÓLICO,





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Optimistic contracts trade tx fees for latency

State channels + optimistic contracts = cheaper disputes

How does it work?

Dispute resolution takes place via assertions instead of being fully computed













The result

Taking turns as part of the worst case dispute in a state channel is **independent** of the computational complexity of the application

Experiment built on Ethereum:

60,000 + 40n gas per state assertion

(where **n** is the number of input bytes)

A cautionary note..

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Related work

- Optimistic contracts https://medium.com/@decanus/optimistic-contracts-fb75efa7ca84
- TrueBit <u>https://people.cs.uchicago.edu/~teutsch/papers/truebit.pdf</u>
- Arbitrum <u>http://stevengoldfeder.com/papers/Arbitrum-USENIX.pdf</u>
- Battleships <u>https://nms.kcl.ac.uk/patrick.mccorry/battleship.pdf</u>

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